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THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE DEFENSE AS A
LIMIT ON THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: ALLISON
V. VINTAGE SPORTS PLA QUES
I. INTRODUCTION
To many, sports trading cards evoke memories of childhood. The
excitement that comes with unwrapping a gum package to see which sports
superstar will be added to a collection of treasured cards colors the lives of
many children. To the athletes whose pictures adorn these cards, the cards
are a source of accomplishment.' Although it is tempting to say that a price
cannot be placed on such childhood activities, fond adult memories, or
athletic pride, sports trading cards are a multi-billion dollar industry.2 To
this end, it is no wonder that many entrepreneurs seek a piece of this
lucrative pie.
New York Yankees former manager Casey Stengel once said,
"[b]aseball's business."3 Baseball, as well as professional sports in general,
has evolved into an important part of the entertainment business.4 As a
result, the sports business contributes significantly to the nation's
economy. 5
Those who buy and collect sports memorabilia create a market that
results in a powerful money and distribution machine generated by
athletes' images. Consequently, athletes' concerns over the presentation of
their names and likenesses to the consuming public, and over the resulting
potential revenue, can clash with the entrepreneur's eagerness to supply
such a burgeoning market.
Amidst these competing interests, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit decided Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques.6 In this
1. See Willie Mays, Foreword to FRANK SLOCUM, ToPPs® BASEB3ALL CARDS (1985).
2. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1274 n.6
(N.D. Okla. 1994). "The trading card market is now a S2.007 billion industry." Id.
3. JAMES EDWARD MILLER, THE BASEBALL BUSINESS: PURSUING PENNANTS AND PROFITS
IN BALTIMORE vii (1990).
4. Id. For example, professional sports spectators may pay from five dollars to 500 dollars
for a chance to see a sports event in person, promoters receive multi-million dollar television
contracts, and athletes sign lucrative endorsement agreements while earning large salaries. Id.
5. Id.
6. 136 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1998).
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case, two well-known and accomplished athletes, Orel Hershiser 7 and
Clifford Allison,8 brought a right of publicity suit 9 against Vintage Sports
Plaques ("Vintage"). 0 Both athletes sought to enjoin Vintage from selling
its sports-themed clocks and plaques that featured sports trading cards
bearing the names and likenesses of Hershiser and Allison."1 Vintage
bought the cards from licensed card manufacturers with whom the athletes
had licensing agreements. 12  In deciding this case, the Eleventh Circuit
applied the first sale doctrine." This is a defense in copyright law that
prevents copyright owners from controlling the use of their copyrighted
work after its initial sale to a third party.'
4
This Note examines the Eleventh Circuit's application of the first sale
doctrine to the right of publicity in Allison.'5  It argues that the Allison
7. Orel Hershiser is a famous baseball pitcher who led the Los Angeles Dodgers to the
World Championship in 1988. WILLIAM F. MCNEIL, THE DODGERS ENCYCLOPEDIA 58 (1997).
Among his many achievements, Hershiser was awarded the National League Cy Young award as
the league's best pitcher, the National League Championship Series Most Valuable Player award,
the World Series Most Valuable Player award, and the Gold Glove award as the National
League's top fielding pitcher. Id. at 59.
8. Clifford Allison was a well-known race car driver. ROBERT CUTrER & BOB FENDELL,
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AUTO RACING GREATS 11 (1973). In 1957, he scored perhaps the first
major Lotus victory at Le Mans and was second in an Oulton Formula Two race. Id. In 1958, he
gave Lotus its first major Grand Prix placing by finishing fourth in the Belgian Grand Prix. Id.
With a Ferrari sports car, Allison placed third in the Nurburgring 1000 and second at Sebring. Id.
In 1960, he was second in the Argentine Grand Prix, first at the Buenes Aires 1000, and first at Le
Mans. Id. In 1961, while driving a Lotus, he placed second in the Glover Trophy. Id.
9. A right of publicity claim seeks to protect and compensate indviduals for the
unauthorized use of their identities for commercial or economic gain. See J. THOMAS
McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 3.1[A], at 3-2 (1998) [hereinafter
MCCARTHY]. Likely damage to one's commercial value is the thrust of a right of publicity claim.
Id. § 3.1[B], at 3-3. To prevail on a prima facie case, the plaintiffs must prove that they "own[ ]
an enforceable right in the identity or persona of a human being;" that the "[d]efendant, without
permission, has used some aspect of identity or persona in such a way that [the] plaintiff is
identifiable from [the] defendant's use;" and that the "[dlefendant's use is likely to cause damage
to the commercial value of that persona." Id.
10. Allison, 136 F.3d at 1444.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1443.
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994). "Work" refers to the creation of an author protected by
the 1976 Copyright Act, as opposed to "copies" or "phonorecords," which are items of tangible
property in which the work is physically embodied. Id. § 101. When discussing copyright law,
this Note focuses on the 1976 Copyright Act, as opposed to the 1909 Copyright Act, unless
otherwise indicated.
15. 136 F.3d at 1447. "There is virtually no case law in any state addressing the application
of the first sale doctrine to the right of publicity .. " But see Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n v. Dad's Kid Corp., 806 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The Allison court applied the first
sale doctrine to the right of publicity issue, but did so without much analysis and without
announcing that it was doing so. Id. at 460.
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court properly decided to apply the first sale doctrine to the right of
publicity. However, the court failed to analyze correctly Allison and
Hershiser's right of publicity claims under the first sale doctrine. Part II
discusses the history and policies supporting copyright law, copyright law's
first sale doctrine defense, and the right of publicity. Part II also explains
that because copyright law and the right of publicity are supported by
similar rationales,1 6 it is appropriate to apply the first sale doctrine to the
right of publicity.
Part III discusses the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Allison, arguing
that the court improperly determined that the sports trading card plaques
and clocks manufactured and sold by Vintage were a mere repackaging or
reselling of the sports trading cards that were protected by the first sale
doctrine. Part III asserts that the court should have concluded that Vintage
created a derivative work, thereby causing Vintage to lose the protection
offered by the first sale doctrine. Further, Part III proposes that the Allison
court should have used a more appropriate "derivative works" standard of
review. Finally, Part IV concludes that the Allison court could have
avoided frustrating the policies behind the right of publicity by applying a
strict derivative works analysis.
II. BACKGROUND
Section 106 of the 1976 Copyright Act grants authors of original
works the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, publicly perform, and
publicly display their copyrighted works,1 7 and to create derivative works.18
These exclusive rights attach automatically to a work that is fixed' 9 in a
16. The right of publicity has been analogized to copyright law, patent law, and trademark
law to explain why the intellectual property defense of the first sale doctrine should also be
applied to the right of publicity. See Nannette Diacovo, Going Once, Going Twice, Sold: The
First Sale Doctrine Defense in Right of Publicity Actions, 12 MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 57
(1994). Diacovo concludes that the right of publicity is most similar to copyright and patent law.
Id. at 92. This Note only explores the similarities between the right of publicity and copyright
law.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
18. Id. Section 101 defines a "derivative work" as "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." Id. § 101.
19. Id. § 101.
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this
title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
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tangible medium of expression.20  The monopoly 2' privilege of copyright
protection, which provides economic incentive for people to create and
disseminate their work, 22 has its roots in the U.S. Constitution2 and has
been codified by Congress.24 The fruits of an author's creation benefit
society as a whole,25 and copyright law rewards copyright owners for their
contribution. 26 However, copyright protection is not absolute.27
A. The First Sale Doctrine in Copyright Law
Congress limited the copyright monopoly with section 109(a)28 of the
1976 Copyright Act.29 Section 109(a) limits the copyright holder's right to
distribute ° copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public.
31
Id.
20. DONALD A. GREGORY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167
(1994). Tangible media of expression include a writing on paper or an electronic recording. Id.
21. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 15 (4th ed.
1993). Copyright grants copyright owners exclusive control over the market for certain uses of
their work. Id.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 419 (1984); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). "[E]ncouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered." Id.
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have power.., to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries... " Id.
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
25. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Ant, 464 U.S. at 419.
26. GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 21, at 16.
27. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-109.
28. Id § 109(a). "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord." Id.
29. Id.
30. A copyright holder's right to distribute applies to the sale, rental, lease, or lending of a
copyrighted work. Id. § 106(3).
31. Id. Section 101 defines "copies" as:
[M]aterial objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. The term "copies" includes the material object, other than a
phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed.
17 U.S.C. § 101. Section 101 defines "phonorecords" as:
[M]aterial objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
"phonorecords" includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.
THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE AS A LIMIT
This limitation, referred to as the first sale doctrine,12 operates as a defense
to a copyright infringement action.33 Under this doctrine, when copyright
owners make an authorized sale of a copy of their work, they "exhaust"
their exclusive intellectual property distribution right in that copy.3 This
allows the copy's purchaser to use or resell the work without infringing on
the copyright. 35 Thus, the copyright owner can control the initial sale of a
copyrighted work, but thereafter, does not retain the right to restrict further
the transfer 36 of possession of the work.37
Consequently, the first sale doctrine limits copyright owners' right to
distribute their work unless the copyright owner independently contracts
with a purchaser to limit the purchaser's right to sell the purchased,
copyrighted items.38 Moreover, the first sale doctrine's limitation on the
right to distribute a copyrighted work attaches only to initial sales, gifts, or
other transfers of title.3 9  Hence, if a copyright owner leases a copy, the
Id. This Note uses the term "copy" to refer to both the terms "copy" and "phonorecord" as
defined by the 1976 Copyright Act. The first sale doctrine limits only the copyright owner's right
to distribute; it does not limit the copyright owner's other section 106 exclusive rights. Id. §
109(a).
32. MELVILLE B. NIMEvffR, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.12[A], at 8-142 (1997)
[hereinafter NIMMER 1997]. The first sale doctrine is firmly established in copyright law. Well
before the first sale doctrine was codified in the 1976 Copyright Act, it existed as a defense to the
right to distribute. See 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1909) (repealed 1978). A provision similar to section 109
can be found in the 1909 Copyright Act. See id. Prior to this early codification, courts
interpreted a copyright owner's distribution right to be limited after the initial sale. See, e.g.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). In Bobbs-Merrill Co., the copyright owner
sold books to a wholesaler, the defendant, who in turn sold the books to third parties. Id. at 342.
The defendant sold the books at a price lower than that allowed under a notice printed in each
book by the copyright owner. Id. The notice stated that selling the books for less than the retail
price of one dollar would be treated as a copyright infringement. Id. The court held that under
the then-existing copyright law, the defendant did not violate the copyright owner's statutorily
created exclusive right to vend or multiply copies because the copyright owner's initial sale to the
wholesaler terminated his right to exclusively do so. Id. at 350-51. The court noted that the
purpose of the copyright statute it was construing was to protect the copyright owner's right to
multiply and sell his production, which does not include the right to control all future retail sales
by notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum. Id. at 351.
33. See NIlvER 1997, supra note 32, § 8.11[B], at 8-141.
34. See DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW § 4E[3][c], at 4-119 (1992).
35. Id.
36. Other than non-exclusive licenses, transfer refers to sale, gift, or any other legal method
of property transfer. See NIMMER 1997, supra note 32, § 8.12[B][1], at 8-145.
37. Id. § 8.12[B][1], at 8-144 to 8-145; see American Int'l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576
F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that the first sale doctrine "extinguishes the copyright
holder's ability to control the course of copies placed in the stream of commerce.").
38. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 62.
39. See NIMMER 1997, supra note 32, § 8.12[B][1], at 8-145 to 8-146. However, the first
sale doctrine does not apply to the sale of phonorecords. Id. § 8.12[B][7], at 8-167 to 8-168.
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lessee will infringe the copyright owner's distribution right by reselling or
leasing that copy unless further leasing is permitted under the original
lease.4 The lessee's mere possession of the copy does not activate the first
sale doctrine.4'
Therefore, once copyright owners put their copyrighted work into the
stream of commerce, the first sale doctrine prevents them from controlling
the purchaser's right to resell the work.42 Thus, the first sale doctrine is
asserted often as a defense in copyright infringement actions.4
B. The First Sale Doctrine Does Not Apply to the Creation of Derivative
Works
A copyright owner has the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works44 from the original copyrighted work.45 A derivative work is a work
that is based upon or that borrows from a preexisting copyrighted work,
46
so as to recast, transform, or adapt the preexisting work.47 To violate a
copyright owner's exclusive right to create a derivative work, the infringing
work must incorporate a portion of the preexisting copyrighted work in
some form" without the consent of the copyright owner.49
The first sale doctrine does not restrict the copyright owner's
exclusive right to prepare a derivative work. ° Although the first sale
Congress determined that applying the doctrine to the rental of phonorecords was a threat to the
record industry. Id. Similarly, Congress exempted computer software rental from the first sale
doctrine since it determined that allowing the doctrine to operate in this market would discourage
the creation of new products. Id. § 8.12 [B1[81, at 8-173; see also 17 U.S.C. § 109(bXlXa)
(1994).
40. See NvIMER 1997, supra note 32, § 8.12[B][1], at 8-145 to 8-146.
41. See id.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
43. See, e.g., American Int'l Pictures, 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Mirage
Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A-R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988); Munoz v. Albuquerque
A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993), aff'd 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994).
44. A "derivative work" is a "work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
45. Id. § 106(2).
46. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 21, at 461; MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, § 3.01, at 3-2 to 3-3 (1998) [hereinafter NIMMER 1998]. However, a derivative work
is not a copyright infringement if the borrowed or copied material is taken with the consent of the
copyright owner. NiMMER 1998, at 3-3 to 3-4.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at62 (1976).
49. See NIMMER 1998, supra note 46, § 3.01, at 3-3 to 3-4.
50. See CIISUM& JACOBS, supra note 34, § 4E[3][c] [iii], at 4-121.
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doctrine allows a subsequent purchaser to resell a copyrighted work
without permission from the copyright owner,"' it does not permit this
purchaser to create an unauthorized derivative work.1
2
The question then becomes, when does a work depart from being a
mere resale of a copyrighted work (that is protected by the first sale
doctrine), and rise to the level of a derivative work (that is not protected by
the first sale doctrine).53 For a derivative work to be created, there must be
a contribution of originality to the preexisting work. 4 Originality renders
the derivative work independently copyrightable if prepared with the
consent of the copyright owner.5 If there is no consent, the contribution of
originality will result in the creation- of an infringing derivative work. 6
According to the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act, a work
violates a copyright owner's exclusive right to create derivative works if
the infringing work "incorporate[s] a portion of the copyrighted work in
some form. 57 This language, coupled with the definition of a derivative
work," suggests a low threshold for creating a derivative work. Merely
incorporating a small portion of a preexisting work into a new work
constitutes sufficient originality to render the new work a derivative one.
Thus, the very definition of a derivative work embodies the requirement of
originality.59 Hence, if a work is "recast, transformed, or adapted" 6 from a
preexisting work, this variation satisfies the originality requirement.61
Some courts have followed a plain language reading of derivative
works to interpret "original" to mean possessing merely a modicum of
originality.62 In order for a work to possess a modicum of originality, the
51. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
52. No reference is made to derivative works in section 109; see also Ce!SUM & JACOBS,
supra note 34, § 4E[3][c][iii], at 4-121.
53. The following discussion refers explicitly to unauthorized derivative works, which are
those prepared without the copyright owner's permission.
54. Originality is a requirement for all copyrighted works. GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra
note 21, at 112-13. The requirement of originality is a constitutional requirement as well as an
explicit statutory mandate. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102; see also L. Batlin &
Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (recognizing that "Originality is,
however, distinguished from novelty; there must be independent creation, but it need not be
invention in the sense of striking uniqueness, ingeniousness, or novelty ... .
55. See NIMMER 1998, supra note 46, § 3.03, at 3-9.
56. Id.
57. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See NIMMER 1998, supra note 46, § 3.01, at 3-3 to 3-4.
62. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir.
1951). "All that is needed ... is that the 'author' contributed something more than a 'merely
1999]
420 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19
work must simply not be copied from other works. 63 These courts tolerate
a low threshold for originality, and find the creation of a derivative work
when the new work deviates only slightly from the preexisting work.
64
However, other courts interpret the originality requirement to mean a
distinguishable 65 variation between the two works that is more than mere
trivial alterations to the preexisting work.66 These courts demand that there
be more than a minimal contribution to the copyrighted work in order to
raise the new work to derivative work status.67 Moreover, in determining
whether the work is derivative, a court may not consider whether a new
work is a qualitative improvement over the preexisting work.68
Despite the fact that there is no concrete definition as to what
constitutes a derivative work, a contribution of originality distinguishes a
derivative work from a non-derivative work. Further, when someone other
than the copyright owner creates a derivative work without the copyright
owner's permission, the first sale doctrine is no longer a viable defense to a
copyright infringement claim.69
C. Rationales for the First Sale Doctrine in Copyright Law
Although the first sale doctrine does not apply to the creation of
derivative works, the doctrine has a well-established place in copyright
law. This can be explained by examining the underlying reasons for its
trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his own."' Id.
63. See Knickerbocker Toy Co. v. Winterbrook Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1309, 1316-18 (D.N.H.
1982); see also GoRMAN & GrNsBURG, supra note 21, at 113.
64. See, e.g., Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993), aff'd
38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994). (holding that when the defendant bought notecards from the
plaintiff his affixing them to ceramic tiles and covering them with a protective layer of acrylic or
epoxy for purposes of selling them amounted to more than just a method of display and rose to
the level of being a derivative work); see also Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,
856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the defendant had created a derivative work not
protected by the first sale doctrine when he bought the plaintiff's artwork prints, glued individual
prints onto ceramic tiles, and offered the tiles with artwork for resale).
65. See NIMVER 1998, supra note 46, § 3.03, at 3-10; see also Lee v. Albuquerque A.R.T.
Co., 925 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. II. 1996), aff'ad 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that when the
defendant affixed onto ceramic tiles notecards created and sold by the plainti such tiles did not
rise to the level of being a derivative work, and thus the defendant was protected by the first sale
doctrine).
66. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
67. See, e.g., Snyder, 536 F.2d at 490 (finding that there must be at least some substantial
variation, and not mere trivial originality, in order to create a derivative work).
68. See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 621 (C.C. D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
69. See C1isum & JACOBS, supra note 34, § 4E[3][c][iii], at 4-121.
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creation, which balance the interests of the copyright owner against the
interests of society. 70
1. Public Policy Opposing Restraints on Trade and Alienation of Property
The first sale doctrine embraces the policy of avoiding restraints on
alienation of property 7' and free trade. 72 Limiting the use of property is
considered repugnant to public policy, which favors trade, bargaining, and
freedom of contract.73 Copyright law also disfavors restraint on alienation
of property. 74
Copyright law grants the copyright owner exclusive rights75 that are
manifested in a tangible object, such as a book, record, or film. 76 The
copyrighted tangible object possesses all the attributes of tangible property,
including the right of alienation. 77 The first sale doctrine recognizes and
enforces the purchaser's right of alienation.78 In other words, once
copyright owners have made an authorized first sale of a copy of their
work, the first sale doctrine becomes applicable as to that copy.79  In
addition, once copyright owners have exercised their exclusive right to
distribute the work, they can no longer attempt to control it by denying the
purchaser the right to resell the copy. ° Continued control would prove
70. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 67.
71. Alienation of property is the conveyance or transfer of property to another. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 26 (Pocket ed. 1996). Therefore, the policy against restraints on alienation of
property supports the presumption that property owners can transfer their property interests.
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 561 (3d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter SINGER]. Restrictions on the ability to transfer property interests are strictly
regulated and often invalid. Id.
72. See NIMMER 1997, supra note 32, § 8.12[A], at 8-142; see also Parfums Givenchy, Inc.
v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1388 (C.D. Cal. 1993). This policy is based
upon the English common law rule against restraint on alienation of property, which holds that
any deed restricting alienation of a fee simple is void because "[ilt is difficult to conceive of a
condition more clearly repugnant to the interest created by a grant of an estate in fee simple than
the condition that the grantee shall not alien the same without the consent of the grantor." Murray
v. Green, 64 Cal. 363, 367 (1883). A fee simple is a property interest that gives the owner the
right to possess and use the property, to sell it or give it away, and the right to devise it by will or
leave it to one's heirs. See SINGER, supra note 71, at 514-16.
73. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 64 (citing Zachariah Chafee Jr., Equitable Servitudes on
Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REv. 946, 982 (1928)).
74. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 65.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
76. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 21, at 14.
77. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 65.
78. See NIMMER 1997, supra note 32, § 8.12[A], at 8-142.
79. See NIMMER 1997, supra note 32, § 8.12[B][1], at 8-144.
80. See NAMMER 1997, supra note 32, § 8.12[B][1], at 8-144 to 8-145.
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antagonistic to the policy against restraint on alienation of property because
it would severely limit the subsequent purchaser's use of the copy.8'
Further, if the copyrighted work could still be controlled by its
original owner, the copy would be removed from the stream of commerce,
thereby depriving society of the work's benefit. In essence, if an individual
who bought a copyrighted work were not allowed to resell it, the value and
usefulness of that work to the buyer and society as a whole would be
substantially diminished. Although copyright owners hold exclusive rights
in their copyrighted work, control over the tangible copies of the
copyrighted property "gives way to the policy opposing restraints of trade
and restraints on alienation.,
8 2
2. The Theory of Just Rewards
A second rationale underlying the limitation on the first sale doctrine
is based on the economic theory of just rewards. 83 A copyright owner's
reward for an initial sale or other disposition of his or her work, in the form
of immediate compensation or royalties, satisfies copyright law's goal to
provide incentives to create and to compensate the creator. 4 Therefore, an
individual who purchases a work from the copyright owner has
compensated the copyright owner for the first sale of the work. The buyer
now has the right to resell the work without having to further compensate
or get permission from the copyright owner.85
The first sale doctrine's application to copyright law involves a
balance of the rights of the copyright owner against the interests of the
public.86 Once copyright owners are financially compensated for the initial
sale of their work, the balance swings in favor of the public's economic
interest in alienating and accessing the property.87 This interest includes
-the right to resell the work.8"
81. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 65.
82. See NIMMER 1997, supra note 32, § 8.12[A], at 8-142.
83. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 67.
84. See id.
85. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 67-68.
86. See id
87. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 68.
88. See id
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D. The Right of Publicity
The right of publicity allows celebrities89 to have the right to benefit
from the commercial value of their identities, including their names,
likenesses, voices, and other indicators of identity.9° This right protects
celebrities against the unauthorized and uncompensated use of their
identities by others for commercial or economic gain.91 It is an intellectual
property right based on state law92 and rooted in the commercial tort of
unfair competition.93
The right of publicity evolved from the inadequacies inherent in the
right of privacy.94 The right to privacy only provides a remedy for the
embarrassing and humiliating impact of the unauthorized use of a person's
persona. 95 It does not protect against the misappropriation of a person's
identity for commercial purposes. 96
The right of publicity is considered to be an assignable property
right97 that applies whether or not the unauthorized use of a celebrity's
name or likeness is deemed offensive.9 Thus, celebrities can sue for
damages if their names or likenesses are used for commercial purposes
without their consent. 99 Examining the rationales supporting the right of
publicity reveals that they are similar to those behind copyright law. 100
89. The right of publicity also applies to non-celebrities. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, §
3.1 [A], at 3-2. This Note focuses on the celebrity's right of publicity.
90. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 203,
218-23 (1954).
91. See id.
92. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 3.1 [A], at 3-2.
93. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 3.1 [A], at 3-3.
94. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 1.8, at 1-34.1 to 1-35.
95. See id.
96. See Haelan Labs, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
Haelan is the first case that legally recognized the right of publicity. Id. at 868. The judge in this
case coined the phrase right to publicity, stating that:
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is common knowledge that
many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their
feelings bruised through public exposure of their likeness, would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains
and subways.
1d.
97. See Nimmer, supra note 90, at 222.
98. See Haelan Labs, Inc., 202 F.2d at 868.
99. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 3.1 [B], at 3-3.
100. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 76-79.
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E. Rationales Supporting The Right of Publicity
Three main policy rationales support the right of publicity: (1) the
falsity justification; (2) the incentive to create justification; and (3) the
natural rights of property/unjust enrichment justification. 10' While the
falsity justification has no analog in copyright law, the latter two rationales
are similar to those that support copyright law. All three theories strongly
support the existence of right of publicity laws. 1
02
1. The Falsity Justification
The falsity justification supporting the right of publicity posits that the
right of publicity prevents fraudulent business practices. 103 This theory has
been asserted from the perspective of both the unwitting celebrity endorser
and the consumer.' 04 Unauthorized commercial use of a celebrity's identity
results in explicit or implicit false representations as to the celebrity's
endorsement of a product. 105 The false representations are injurious to
celebrities if these endorsements connect celebrities to a product of which
they may not approve or with which they may not wish to be associated. 1 6
At the same time, consumers are misled by an unauthorized claim of
endorsement. 10 7 Although falsity supports the right of publicity, falsity is
not necessary to state a claim for infringement of the right of publicity. 18
A right of publicity claim exists for the unauthorized use of a
celebrity's name or likeness, regardless of whether that use endorses a
101. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 77.
102. The right of publicity is criticized for, among other reasons, its power to limit
communication and expression. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:
Popular Culture and Publicity Right, 81 CAL. L. RFV. 125, 145-46 (1993).
[T]he power to license is the power to suppress. When the law gives a celebrity a
right of publicity, it does more than funnel additional income her way. It gives her
(or her assignee) a substantial measure of power over the production and circulation
of meaning and identity in our society: power, if she so chooses, to suppress
readings or appropriations of her persona that depart from, challenge, or subvert the
meaning she prefers; power to deny to others the use of her persona in the
construction and communication of alternative or oppositional identities and social
relations; power, ultimately, to limit the expressive and communicative
opportunities of the rest of us.
Id.
103. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.4, at 2-15.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.4, at 2-16.
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product implicitly or explicitly.' 9 Thus, to state a right of publicity claim,
a celebrity does not have to prove that anyone was actually deceived or
confused by the unauthorized use of the celebrity's image."1 0
2. The Incentive to Create Justification is Shared by Copyright Law and
the Right of Publicity
Similar to copyright law, the right of publicity is strongly grounded in
a rationale that encourages individuals to create for the benefit of society as
a whole."' According to this rationale, individuals should be given an
economic incentive to participate in socially useful or enriching activities
that elevates one's status to that of a public figure." 2 Implicit in this theory
is the notion that fame and recognition by themselves are not great enough
incentives." Individuals' willingness to become public figures increases if
their identities are protected so that they may control the commercialization
of their images." 4  Otherwise, celebrities' trepidation that their identities
will be used for unauthorized purposes may discourage celebrities from
engaging in socially beneficial activities that occur for the benefit of a
public audience." '
Furthermore, this policy recognizes that a celebrity who gives up a
certain amount of privacy for an endeavor that benefits society should be
afforded the opportunity to profit from this commercially marketable
identity." 6 Some of the efforts encouraged by the right of publicity include
activities in entertainment, sports, law, science, and medicine. All of these
activities benefit society as whole." 7 For example, an entertainer's human
109. Id. "A clearly false endorsement is separately actionable under state law or Lanham
Act § 43(a) as a form of false or misleading advertising." Id. Also, note that defenses to some
right of publicity actions are copyright's fair use doctrine or the First Amendment. See
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1271, 1275 (N.D.
Okla. 1994); see also Nimmer, supra note 90, at 212.
110. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.4, at 2-16.
111. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.2[A], at 2-10.
112. See id. By definition a "celebrity" is a widely known public figure. See WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 359 (unabridged 1986). However, because the right
of publicity is also available to non-celebrities, the term public figure describes individuals whose
success and prominence in their chosen professions results in commercial gain and benefits the
public. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.2, at 2-10.1. This can include professionals in
entertainment, sports, law, medicine, and science. Id.
113. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.2, at 2-10.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id
117. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.2, at 2-10 to 2-10.1.
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cannonball act at a county fair" 8 may bring people together for the sake of
entertainment and socializing; may inspire conversation, new ideas, and
social discourse; and may generate revenue and jobs. The right of publicity
ensures that this entertainer is protected and compensated for participating
in this socially enriching activity."19
In this light, the right of publicity is similar to the policy behind
copyright law that supports the incentive to create. 20 In Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,121 the Court recognized that granting an
individual a property right similar to that of a copyright, in the form of the
right of publicity, will encourage an individual to pursue an activity that
places the individual in the public arena, 22 and that ultimately enriches
society as a whole. 123
3. The Natural Rights of Property and Unjust Enrichment Justifications
are Shared by Copyright Law and the Right of Publicity
Just as copyright law protects a copyrighted work in the form of a
property right, the right of publicity protects the property interest inherent
in one's identity. 24 The right of publicity prevents unjust enrichment.1
a
This ensures that others cannot, without authorization, profit from a
celebrity's fame which may have taken years of hard work to achieve.
26
The natural property rights and unjust enrichment policy theories of the
right of publicity rest on the notion that individuals own their identities.
127
118. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
119. In Zacchini, the Court found that the human cannonball entertainer was entitled to
compensation for the fifteen second broadcast of his performance on a television news program to
which be did not consent. Id.
120. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, at 2-10.
121. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
122. Id. at 576-77.
Of course, Ohio's decision to protect petitioner's right of publicity here rests on
more than a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in
his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public. This same
consideration underlies the patent and copyright laws long enforced by this
Court .... These laws.., were "intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable
rights" in order to afford greater encouragement to the production of works of
benefit to the public .... The Constitution does not prevent Ohio from making a
similar choice here in deciding to protect the entertainer's incentive in order to
encourage the production of this type of work.
Id. (citations omitted).
123. Id.
124. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.1[A], at 2-1.
125. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 78.
126. See id.
127. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.1 [A], at 2-2.
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Therefore, celebrities should be able to financially benefit when their
identities are used for the commercial benefit of others. 128 If a person uses
another's identity without authorization for commercial and financial
benefit, then the individual is "riding on another's coattails."' 129 Hence,
celebrities should be able to benefit from the property right inherent in their
own persona when this persona produces a desired public good. Thus, the
right of publicity gives an individual an incentive to become famous and to
create.130 This creativity in turn benefits society as a whole.'
3'
As with the right of publicity, the theory of unjust enrichment also
underlies copyright law. 32 By granting a creator the sword of a protectable
copyright, copyright law prevents others from appropriating and exploiting
the copyrighted work without permission from the copyright owner and
without paying for its use.
133
Thus, two of the strongest policies that support the right of publicity,
giving incentive to create and preventing unjust enrichment, similarly
underlie copyright law.13' Because Congress limited the protection of
copyright law through the first sale doctrine,135 the question arises whether
the same doctrine is needed to limit the protection granted by the right of
publicity.
136
F. Rationales for Applying the First Sale Doctrine to the Right of
Publicity
Three rationales support applying the first sale doctrine to the right of
publicity: (1) just rewards; (2) preventing restraint on alienation of
property; and (3) the secondary market rationale. 37 The two theories that
support the use of the first sale doctrine in copyright law, preventing
restraint on alienation of property and just rewards, 3 also support the use
of the first sale doctrine in right of publicity actions. In addition, the
secondary market rationale, which does not underlie copyright law,
128. See id.
129. See McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.1 [A], at 2-3.
130. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 78.
131. See id.
132. See GoRmAN & GINSBURG, supra note 21, at 22 (quoting William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325-33, 344-46
(1989)).
133. See id.
134. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 79.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
136. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 79.
137. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 80-82.
138. See supra Part II.C.1-2.
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nonetheless supports the application of the first sale doctrine to the right of
publicity.139
1. The Just Rewards Theory
The just rewards theory supporting the first sale doctrine in copyright
law also applies to limiting the right of publicity. 140 Under the just rewards
theory, once celebrities financially benefit from the authorized commercial
use of their name or likeness in a first sale, by placing a good bearing their
name or likeness into the stream of commerce, they can no longer control
the distribution of such goods with the protection of the right of
publicity.141  Just as the copyright owner loses the right to control
distribution of a copyrighted work after the initial sale, celebrities who
authorize the use of their name or likeness for commercial goods should
not be able to control distribution of these goods aftr the initial sale. 142
The initial sale provides celebrities just compensation for the use of
their name or likeness and for the effort and skill that went into achieving
fame.' 43 Having already been compensated for the initial sale, celebrities
should not be allowed to continuously profit from the good at the
consumer's expense. Moreover, the subsequent purchaser should be
allowed to resell the good without fear of infringing on the celebrity's right
of publicity.' 44
In Major League Baseball Players Ass 'n v. Dad's Kid Corp., 145 the
court found that "baseball players have little if any continuing publicity
rights with respect to the use and reuse of their pictures on cards by
subsequent purchasers and sellers of duly licensed baseball cards following
a perfectly proper first sale into commerce for which the players get a
royalty."'" Although the court did not provide an in-depth analysis of the
first sale doctrine's application to the right of publicity, it nonetheless
applied this doctrine to limit the right.
139. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 80-81.
140. See supra Part II.C.2. The just rewards theory of the first sale doctrine in copyright
law states that once an individual has received financial compensation for the initial sale of his
copyrighted work, subsequent purchasers should be free to resell that work without infringing on
'that individual's copyright. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 80.
141. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 80.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id
145. 806 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
146. Id. at 460.
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2. The Theory Against Restraint on Alienation of Property
The theory against restraint on alienation of property is so widely
accepted, it has been suggested that it should apply to any issue involving
tangible property.147 This application would include intellectual property
covered by copyright law' 8 and the property right celebrities possess in
their image under the right of publicity.' 49
Just because a celebrity's name or likeness is attached to a product, a
subsequent purchaser should not be prevented from reselling the product. 5 0
Applying the first sale doctrine to the right of publicity not only allows
subsequent purchasers to use and enjoy their personal property, but also
ensures that the product is not removed from the stream of commerce, thus
allowing society to continue to reap its benefits.' 5 '
As in copyright law, for the first sale doctrine to work as a limitation
and defense to the right of publicity, it must apply to the tangible property
and not to the intangible intellectual property right. 5 2 For example, the
first sale doctrine would limit a celebrity's control over the sale of a t-shirt
bearing his or her name or likeness after an authorized first sale, such that a
purchaser has the right to turn around and resell the t-shirt. However, the
celebrity would retain the exclusive intellectual property rights of his or her
identity even after the first sale. '13 Thus, the first sale doctrine serves to
balance the property and economic rights of the celebrity with those of.the
public.' 4
3. The Secondary Market Rationale
The secondary market rationale balances the interests of the
individual asserting the right of publicity claim against those of individuals
147. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 82.
148. See supra Part II.C.l. To promote the purchase and sale of both real and personal
property, the freedom to contract, and the free flow of goods in the stream of commerce, common
law disfavors restraints on alienation. Id. This policy is furthered in copyright law by applying
the first sale doctrine, which prevents the copyright owner from retaining control of the tangible
copy of the copyrighted work after the first sale. See NIMMER 1997, supra note 32, § 8.12[A], at
8-142 to 8-144. The subsequent purchaser is then free to resell the copy. Id.
149. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 82.
150. See id.
151. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 81-82; see also supra Part I.C.I (discussing prevention
of restraint on alienation in copyright law).
152. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 82.
153. See id.
154. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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who deal in the secondary market of a product.1 5' The secondary market is
the market of goods that develops after the first sale. 5 6  Typically, this
balance favors the secondary market for goods because there is a need for a
secondhand goods market. 1 7  Consumers who cannot afford to pay the
price of new goods rely on secondhand stores to provide them with lower-
priced products. 58 Further, consumers who want to purchase antique and
collectible goods turn to secondhand stores for these goods because they
are not available in firsthand stores. 59 If the secondary market is
diminished, then consumers do not have access to secondhand goods.' 6°
As a result, this lack of access harms the economy.1
6 1
Application of the first sale doctrine to the right of publicity allows
the secondary market of goods bearing the name or likeness of a celebrity
to exist. 162 If the first sale doctrine was not allowed to limit the right of
publicity, then the health of numerous, booming secondary markets would
suffer.163  Consequently, the nation's economy would suffer.' 64
Secondhand dealers who sell books, memorabilia, and clothing that bear
the name or likeness of a celebrity would be prohibited from selling these
items if the first sale doctrine did not limit a celebrity's right of publicity. 165
The practical effect of applying the first sale doctrine to the right of
publicity means that a celebrity no longer has the right to profit from the
resale of a good bearing his or her name or likeness after an authorized first
sale. 166 Just as courts deciding copyright cases have weighed in favor of
the economic interests of society against those of the individual, 67 the
155. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 81.
156. See id
157. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 73.
158. See id.
159. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 81.
160. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 73.
161. See id.
162. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 81.
163. See id. (noting antique dealers, thrift stores, secondhand stores, and garage sales would
be prevented from selling goods with anyone's name on them); see also Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n v. Dad's Kid Corp., 806 F. Supp. 458, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing that there
is a substantial secondary market for baseball cards and baseball card derivative works).
164. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 81.
165. See id
166. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 83. However, this cost can be factored into the first sale
of the product bearing the celebrity's image.
167. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428-29 (1984). The
Court held that the sale of home videotape recorders did not constitute contributory infringement
of television program copyrights. Id. Further, the Court noted that defining the scope of
copyright ownership "involves a difficult balance between the interest of authors and inventors in
the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's
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economic interests of celebrities should also give way to the economic
interests of society in right of publicity cases. 168 In Major League Baseball
Players Ass 'n,169 the court recognized that an "enormous secondary market
exists for baseball cards and baseball card derivative works,"'170 and
concluded that the baseball player's right of publicity does not continue
after the first sale of trading cards bearing his name and likeness.'
7'
Accordingly, applying the first sale doctrine as a limitation on the
right of publicity promotes the economic interests of society.' 72 Despite
this logic, courts have not applied the first sale doctrine to the right of
publicity until recently. In Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques,'" the court
broke new ground by analyzing the first sale doctrine's place in right of
publicity actions.' 74 The Allison court's approach warrants examination,
for fame and the entrepreneurial spirit are likely to continue to clash.
III. ALLISON V. VINTAGE SPORTS PL4QUES
A. Background
Clifford Allison, a well-known racecar driver, entered into a licensing
agreement with Maxx Race Cards ("Maxx"), whereby Maxx would
manufacture and market trading cards bearing Allison's likeness. In
exchange, Allison received a royalty of the sales receipts. 17 Orel Hershiser
is a famous professional baseball player who had a licensing agreement
with the Major League Baseball Players Association ("MLBPA").176 This
agreement granted MLBPA the right to use and license Hershiser's name
and image for commercial purposes in exchange for a share of the gross
sales revenues. 177 MLPBA licensed Hershiser's name and image to various
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand." Id. at
429.
168. See id
169. 806 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
170. Id. at 460.
171. Id.
172. See Diacovo, supra note 16, at 82.
173. 136 F.3d 1443 (llth Cir. 1998).
174. See id. at 1448.
175. Id. At the time of trial, the royalties were being paid to Allison's estate, a plaintiff in
the case. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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trading card companies that manufactured and marketed cards bearing his
image.
178
Defendant, Vintage Sports Plaques ("Vintage"), purchased trading
cards bearing the likenesses of Allison and Hershiser from licensed card
manufacturers and distributors. 79 Vintage then framed the cards by
mounting them between a transparent acrylic sheet and a board of wood
and labeled each plaque with an identification plate bearing the name of the
player or the team represented. 8° Some of the plaques featured a clock
with a sports motif.'8 ' Vintage marketed each clock as a "Limited Edition"
or an "Authentic Collectible."' 82 Hershiser and Allison received royalties
from the card manufacturers with whom they had licensing agreements for
the initial sale of the cards to Vintage. However, Vintage had no licensing
agreement with Allison or Hershiser and Vintage never paid them for using
their names or images.'83 Allison and Hershiser's suit alleged that Vintage
violated their right of publicity and asked for injunctive and declaratory
relief.'" The district court granted Vintage's motion for summary
judgment on the right of publicity claim.'85 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 1
86
B. Discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's Ruling
1. The Allison Court Properly Concluded that the First Sale Doctrine
Should Be Applied to the Right of Publicity
The Allison court recognized that the first sale doctrine had rarely
been applied to right of publicity actions, 18 7 but theorized that its
178. Id
179. Allison, 136 F.3d at 1444.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 1444-45.
184. Id. at 1445.
185. Allison, 136 F.3d at 1445.
186. Id. at 1444.
187. Id. at 1448. But see Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Dad's Kid Corp., 806 F.
Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Major League Baseball Players Ass'n applied the first sale doctrine,
but did so without much analysis and without announcing that it was doing so. Id. at 459-60. As
a preliminary matter, the Allison court recognized that Alabama does not have a right of publicity
law. Allison, 136 F.3d at 1448. The court noted that only sixteen states have judicially or
statutorily recognized the right of publicity. Id. at 1447. However, the court read Alabama's
right to privacy law as protecting the same commercial interests that other states' right of
publicity laws protect. Id. The court noted that in order to recover on a right to publicity claim, a
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applicability had perhaps been taken for granted.'88 The court based this
theory on the fact that some states had codified the first sale doctrine in
their right of publicity laws.' 9 Presuming that the first sale doctrine
applies to the right of publicity, the court addressed Allison and Hershiser's
contentions as to why the doctrine should not apply. 19
The athletes argued that the first sale doctrine should not apply to
their right of publicity action.' 91 They contended that other intellectual
property rights' 92 which recognize the first sale doctrine limitation differ
from the right of publicity.' 93 Allison and Hershiser reasoned that other
intellectual property rights merely protect tangible copyrighted property,
such as a particular product or photograph,' 94 whereas the right of publicity
protects a celebrity's identity as it travels with an article of tangible
property. 95  The court rebutted this argument by pointing out that both
copyright law and the right of publicity protect more than just tangible
items.' 9 The court explained that the right of publicity protects a
celebrity's identity and copyright law protects the expression of the
copyright owner, which is manifested in the copyrighted work.1
97
The court went on to explain what it considered to be an even more
compelling reason to apply the first sale doctrine to the right of publicity:
the secondary market rationale.'98 The court explained that not applying
the first sale doctrine would "grant a monopoly to celebrities over their
identities that would upset the delicate 'balance between the interests of the
plaintiff must "demonstrate that there is a 'unique quality of value in [his] likeness' [ ] that, if
appropriated would result in 'commercial profit' to the defendant." Id. (quoting Schifano v.
Greene County Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So. 2d 178, 181 (Ala. 1993)).
188. Allison, 136 F.3d at 1448.
189. Id at 1448 n.8. The court quoted from FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(3Xb):
The provision of this section [protecting a right of privacy] shall not apply to:...
The use of such name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness in connection with the
resale or other distribution of literary, musical, or artistic productions or other
articles of merchandise or property whether such person has consented to the use of
his or her name, portrait, photograph, or likeness on or in connection with the initial
sale or distribution thereof....
Id.
190. Allison, 136 F.3d at 1448.
191. Id.
192. Id. The court's opinion does not specify which intellectual property rights Allison and
Hershiser referred to, but the court rebutted their argument based on copyright law principles. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Allison, 136 F.3d at 1448.
197. Id.
198. d at 1449.
1999]
434 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 19
celebrity and those of the public." ' 199 This, the court reasoned, would have
a profoundly negative effect on the trading card market, a multi-billion
dollar industry.20" For example, by not applying the first sale doctrine to
right of publicity actions, a child would be prohibited from reselling a
rightfully purchased baseball card to a friend.201 Thus, the court concluded
that the first sale doctrine should be allowed to limit the right of
publicity.
202
The court asserted that whether or not the first sale doctrine would
limit Allison and Hershiser's control of the trading cards after the first sale
to Vintage hinged on whether Vintage's use of the cards was "reselling.,
203
If the use of the cards was reselling, Vintage's use of the trading cards
would fall under the protection of the first sale doctrine.2"" If Vintage's use
of the cards was not reselling but more like "using Plaintiffs' names and
likenesses to sell frames and clocks," its use of the cards would not be
protected by the first sale doctrine. 05 Therefore, if the plaques and clocks
were considered to be derivative works,20 6 then these objects would not be
protected by the first sale doctrine.20 7
2. The Allison Court Did Not Properly Apply the First Sale Doctrine
While the Allison court properly concluded that the first sale doctrine
should apply to the right of publicity, it did not properly apply this doctrine
to the facts of the case. The central inquiry in the application of the first
sale doctrine to right of publicity actions should be whether a derivative
work208 has been created, a concept borrowed from copyright law. 209 The
court erred in its classification of the Vintage clocks and plaques as a
reselling as opposed to derivative works.
199. Id. (citing White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir., 1993)).
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. See Allison, 136 F.3d at 1448.
203. See id. at 1450.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. The Allison court does not use the term "derivative work" but instead distinguishes
between mere repackaging or reselling and "products separate and distinct from the trading cards
they incorporate." Id The court notes that if Vintage's products are more similar to the latter,
then "arguably Vintage is selling a product by 'commercially exploiting the likeness[es of
appellants] intending to engender profits to their enterprise,' a practice against which the right of"
publicity seems clearly to protect." Id (quoting Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
207. Id.
208. See supra Part II.B (discussing derivative works).
209. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994).
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The distinction between a reselling and a derivative work is critical.
If the court found that a derivative work was created, then the first sale
doctrine would not be available to Vintage as a defense, and the celebrity
athletes would have succeeded with their right of publicity claim.210 If
successful, the athletes would have continued to retain control over the
trading cards after the first sale. However, a finding of a reselling would
grant Vintage the right to resell the trading cards, even in a very different
form from the one authorized by the athletes.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not provide a meaningful
analysis of its decision to classify the Vintage clock and plaques as a mere
reselling rather than the creation of derivative works. Instead, the Court of
Appeals decided that the district court had correctly entered summary
judgment in favor of Vintage.21 ' The court stated:
[It is] unlikely that anyone would purchase one of Vintage's
plaques for any reason other than to obtain a display of the
mounted cards themselves. Although we recognize that the
plaques that include a clock pose a closer case, we conclude that
it is unlikely that anyone would purchase one of the clock
plaques simply to obtain a means of telling time, believing the
clock to be, for example, a "Hershiser Clock" or an "Allison
Clock.
212
Thus, with little discussion, the court implicitly decided that the
Vintage plaques and clocks were not derivative works. By foregoing a
meaningful derivative works analysis, the court erroneously concluded that
Vintage's sale of the clocks and plaques were protected by the first sale
doctrine. This conclusion foreclosed a finding that Allison and Hershiser
retained control over the trading cards bearing their images.
Further, the logic the Allison court used to decide that the Vintage
products were a mere reselling was flawed. The Allison court's assertion
that a consumer likely purchased a Vintage product thinking it was buying
a repackaged trading card, as opposed to a "Hershiser Clock" or "Allison
Clock," is doubtful. It seems much more likely that if the consumer wanted
to buy a trading card, then the consumer would have simply bought a
trading card. Generally, people purchase clocks for their time-telling
function or for their uniqueness as a design object. To the sports fan and
memorabilia collector, the latter reason is especially true because a trading
210. See supra Part II.B. Because the first sale doctrine does not apply to the creation of
derivative works in copyright law, by analogy it should not be a defense to the creation of
derivative works in the right of publicity context. Id
211. Allison, 136 F.3d 1443 at 1451.
212. See id
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card clock is a unique, new, and different piece of memorabilia to add to
one's collection; it is not just another trading card. Because the Vintage
clocks and plaques presented Allison and Hershiser's identities in a form
that was not authorized, the athletes had no control over how their identities
were released to the public.
In addition, the athletes could have made derivative works from the
trading cards in the form of clocks and plaques and thus made money from
this commercial use of their images. Hence, they had not exhausted this
possible use of their trading cards. Alternatively, the appropriate licensee,
Maxx or the MLBPA, also could have made the clocks and plaques with
the royalties going to the athletes. Because Vintage had already made and
sold the clocks and plaques, it had begun to supply the market with sports
trading card clocks and plaques.213 Thus, Vintage had saturated, or at least
begun to saturate, the market. This diminishes the market of consumers
who might possibly purchase such a product from the legitimate licensees.
As the right of publicity is designed to protect the financial and commercial
interests of the celebrity,214 it is appropriate to examine the financial impact
Vintage's products have on Allison and Hershiser. The potential negative
effects Vintage's products could have on the athletes' commercial interests
supports the argument that Vintage created derivative works, which would
prevent a successful first sale defense.
Furthermore, it was improper for the Allison court to consider whether
Vintage's products were an improvement of the preexisting trading
cards.215  Such a judgment is subjective, and consequently arbitrary. If
improvement was allowed to be a factor when applying the first sale
doctrine to right of publicity actions, court decisions would lack uniformity
and generate legal uncertainty. This in turn would create uncertainty for
individuals who might be in danger of creating a product that infringes on
another's right of publicity. Such individuals would have no guidelines
upon which to rely in deciding whether to proceed with the creation of a
new work that they believe may rise to the level of a derivative work.
213. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1274
(N.D. Okla. 1994). The defendant in this case argued unsuccessfully, that the plaintiffrs product
had the potential to expropriate market shares from licensed baseball cards. Id. It appeared as
though the court discounted this argument not because it lacked merit, but because the plaintiff
did not offer evidence to support it. Id.
214. See supra Part II.D-E.
215. See NIMvIER 1998, supra note 46, § 3.03, at 3-10; see also Emerson v. Davies, 8 F.
Cas. 615, 621 (C.C. D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436). The Allison court notes that the district court
properly concluded "'Vintage is selling the trading cards after presenting them in, what some
consumers deem to be, a more attractive display."' Allison, 136 F.3d at 1450.
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In addition, whether or not a new work is an improvement over a
preexisting work is immaterial in deciding whether a derivative work has
been created.216 If a new work is found to be worse than the preexisting
work, then the new work would not be purchased and used by consumers;
if the new work is found to be better than the preexisting work, then it
would likely be purchased and used by consumers.2 Either way, this has
no bearing on whether a derivative work has actually been created.1 8 In
this respect, the Allison district court erred, for it improperly considered
whether Vintage's products were an improvement over the trading cards
alone.219
In deciding the case in favor of Vintage, the district court took into
account that "Vintage is selling the trading cards after presenting them in,
what consumers deem to be, a more attractive display." 220 The court does
not explain how it determined that consumers think the trading cards are
more attractive when displayed in Vintage's products. Furthermore, this
qualitative assessment as to whether consumers may find the plaques and
clocks more attractive than the trading cards, or vice versa, is irrelevant.
Either way, the clocks and plaques should have been viewed as a wholly
different product than the trading cards.
The Allison district court used its improper qualitative finding to
further conclude that the substantial return on Vintage's investment was
based on its "improvement of the trading cards rather than the creation of a
new good. ' 221 The district court's distinction between a work that is an
"improvement" and one that is a "new work" is an arbitrary, semantic
difference.
This distinction also fails because it presents a causation problem.
How does the court know that sales increased due to the "improvement"
rather than the creation of a new good? Even if the court could and did
explain this difference, it should not be a factor in the determination of
whether Vintage created derivative works.
Finally, in classifying the Vintage products as an "improvement" of
the trading cards, the district court implied that the Vintage clocks and
plaques were more than a mere deviation of the trading cards, which is the
216. See Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 621.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, No. 95-P-1555-S, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19783, at
*12 (N.D. Ala. July 30, 1996).
220. Id. at *14.
221. Id.
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very definition of a derivative work.222 In effect, by calling the Vintage
clocks and plaques an improvement, the court acknowledged that they were
derivative works. This acknowledgement is logically at odds with the
district court and the appellate court's tacit finding that Vintage did not
create derivative works. For these reasons, the court erred in finding that
Vintage had not created derivative works with its plaques and clocks, as
opposed to mere reselling.
3. The Appropriate Derivative Works Standard of Review
a. The Mirage and Munoz Derivative Works Standard in Copyright
Infringement Claims
Two cases prove instructive in determining the level of review that
the Allison court should have applied in its derivative works analysis. In
Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.RT. Co.,223 the court held that the
defendant created a derivative work, and thus infringed the plaintiff's
copyright, when he made decorative tiles by using the plaintiff's
copyrighted artwork. The defendant made the decorative tiles by
incorporating artwork prints he bought from the plaintiff, the exclusive
copyright holder of the artwork. 224 The defendant affixed individual prints
of the copyrighted artwork onto ceramic tiles, placed a plastic film over the
surface of the tiles, and sold the tiles in the retail market. 225 The court
concluded that by "borrowing and mounting the preexisting, copyrighted
individual images without the consent of the copyright proprietors," the
defendant had made a derivative work, "another version" of the
copyrighted work.226 The Mirage court called attention to the definition of
a derivative work in copyright law as, in part, "any other form in which a
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 227 This court also pointed
out that legislative history indicates that a copyright owner's exclusive
right to prepare derivative works is violated when "the infringing work...
incorporate[s] a portion of the copyrighted work in some form. 
' 221
222. See supra Part II.B (discussing derivative works).
223. 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
224. See id. at 1342.
225. See id
226. See id. at 1343.
227. See id; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
228. Mirage Editions, Inc., 856 F.2d at 1344 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976)
(emphasis in original)).
THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE ASA LIMIT
Thus, the Mirage court decided that the defendant, in making
decorative tiles by incorporating and mounting preexisting, copyrighted
artwork without the copyright owner's consent, thereby created an
infringing derivative work.229 Consequently, the defendant could not use
the first sale doctrine as a defense.230
Similarly, in Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R T Co.,231 the court concluded
that the defendant created an infringing derivative work when he affixed
copyrighted notecards to ceramic tiles for the purpose of selling them
without the copyright owner's consent. 232 This court also pointed to the
language of section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act23 3 to conclude that
permanently affixing a notecard to a ceramic tile was recasting,
transforming, or adapting the original, copyrighted artwork.2 The Munoz
court distinguished tile mounting from framing, noting that the latter
amounts only to a method of display and not to a derivative work. 235 Thus,
as in Mirage,236 the defendant was not able to invoke the first sale doctrine
to defend against the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim.
237
b. The Effect of Mirage and Munoz on Allsion v. Vintage Sports Plaques
The relevant inquiry in a derivative works analysis in the copyright
context is whether and to what degree a new work incorporates a
preexisting work. 238 The Mirage and Munoz decisions suggest that if an
object incorporates a preexisting work to any degree, is mounted, and
offered for resale, the result is a derivative work. The two courts arrived at
this conclusion by focusing on the plain language of section 101's
definition of a derivative work239 and the legislative history behind the
Copyright Act.m
Had the Allison court applied this standard to the Vintage products, it
would have found that Vintage had created derivative works. Because the
Mirage and Munoz courts concluded that simply mounting preexisting
229. See id
230. See id.
231. 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993) affd, 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994).
232. See Munoz, 829 F. Supp. at 311, 314.
233. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
234. See Munoz, 829 F. Supp. at 314.
235. Id.
236. 856 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988).
237. See Munoz, 829 F. Supp. at 315.
238. See supra Part H.B.
239. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining a "derivative work" as, in pertinent part, "any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.").
240. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976).
1999]
440 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTA INMENT LAWJOUR NAL [Vol. 19
copyrighted prints onto ceramic tiles created a derivative work, then
certainly mounting and inserting trading cards onto clocks and plaques also
creates a derivative work.
c. Proposed Two-Step Inquiry to Determine if the First Sale Doctrine
Should Operate as a Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim
The relevant inquiry in deciding whether the first sale doctrine
operates as a defense to a right of publicity claim is whether the celebrity's
image is being used without his or her permission to sell an infringing
derivative work for the financial gain of someone other than the celebrity.
This determination involves a two step inquiry.24'
i. Step One: Has a Derivative Work Been Created Based on a Mere
Deviation Standard
The first step in this analysis is to decide whether a derivative work
has been created. In the right of publicity context, the focus should be on
how much the new work has changed the preexisting work. Courts should
adhere to the plain language of section 101's definition of a derivative
work,242 thereby taking a strict and narrow view of what constitutes a
derivative work. In doing so, courts should apply the Mirage-Munoz
standard, which was derived from the plain language of section 101. This
standard states that a derivative work has been created if it incorporates to
any degree a preexisting work, is mounted, and offered for resale.
Essentially, this is a mere deviation standard. This mere deviation standard
should apply to all right of publicity cases in which the first sale doctrine is
asserted as a defense. Thus, a derivative work is created if the new work is
even a mere deviation of a preexisting work.
There are several reasons why a court should apply a strict
interpretation of the creation of a derivative work in a right of publicity
case. First, because a celebrity's name or likeness continues to travel with
the tangible property, the risk exists that the celebrity's actual identity
(name and likeness) will be misused or misrepresented. Celebrities' names
241. Because Allison is one of the first cases to apply the first sale doctrine to the right of
publicity with any meaningful analysis, the two-step inquiry proposed here is based on the right
of publicity's goal to protect celebrities from unauthorized use of their identities for the financial
gain of another, and on the shared rationales of copyright law and the right of publicity.
242. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a derivative work, in part, as a "work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.").
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and likenesses identify them and consequently trigger thoughts and
impressions of them in others. A celebrity's name or likeness can evoke
either a favorable or unfavorable opinion of that celebrity, divorced from
any then-observable, concrete action of the celebrity. This uniquely
impacts celebrities whose public persona and approval rating is as
important to their commercial success and livelihood as is their talent. In
contrast, a private individual's professional success often has no relation to
public opinion.
This strict standard is appropriate, as any deviation from an
authorized use of a celebrity's image tampers with the celebrity's identity.
Identity is the very asset that helps celebrities become famous, and partially
accounts for the very means of the celebrity's livelihood. Thus, a strict
derivative works standard preserves celebrities' control over their
identities. Protecting a celebrity's identity also supports the policy behind
the right of publicity by encouraging individuals to enter the public arena
for the benefit of society and ensuring that the celebrity is compensated and
protected for doing so.
ii. Step Two: Is the Celebrity's Image Being Used to Sell a New
Product?
The second step in deciding whether the first sale doctrine can operate
as a defense in a right of publicity action is whether the celebrity's image is
being used without permission to sell a new product. 243 This determination
is crucial because it serves the right of publicity's rationale of protecting
celebrities against the unauthorized and uncompensated use of their
identities for the commercial and economic benefit of others. If the
celebrity's image is being used to sell a new product, then the celebrity
deserves to profit from such sales or, alternatively, should be entitled to
have a court enjoin unauthorized dealers from doing so.
d. Applying the Two-Step Inquiry to Allison
Applying this two-part analysis to the Allison case reveals that
Vintage created a derivative work and used Allison and Hershiser's image
to sell this new product. Just as in Mirage and Munoz, where the
defendants created new products,244 Vintage created a new product in the
243. See Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1450 (1 lth Cir. 1998) (noting
that it must decide whether the Vintage products were more like a reselling of the trading cards or
more like using the athlete's names and likenesses to sell frames and clocks).
244. Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A-R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1988);
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form of sports-themed clocks and plaques from preexisting trading cards.
Vintage's clocks and plaques were, at the very least, a mere deviation of
the trading cards, as the cards' incorporation into Vintage's product
resulted in a product with a new use and form. The trading cards were
transformed from trading cards into plaques and clocks. The Vintage
clocks were even marketed as "Limited Edition[s]" or "Authentic
Collectible[s]. ' 245 Thus, the Vintage clocks and plaques were a mere
deviation of the trading cards and not a reselling.
Although the celebrities did not authorize the creation or sale of these
products bearing their images, Vintage sold their plaques and clocks by'
associating them with Allison and Hershiser. In fact, without Allison and
Hershiser's images, Vintage's products would not exist as sports-themed
products but would merely be a generic clock and a blank plaque.
Vintage's official company name, "Vintage Sports Plaques," attests to its
mission to supply and sell sports-themed merchandise.
As a result of Vintage's use of Allison and Hershiser's images, the
athletes seem to be endorsing a product that they may not approve of or
with which they may not want to be associated. Such an association could
injure the image and reputation Allison and Hershiser wish to foster and
present to the public. For example, Hershiser and Allison may not want the
public to believe that they will endorse any piece of memorabilia. They
may have personal reasons for not wanting to be associated with a plaque
or clock. Perhaps the athletes do not particularly like Vintage's execution
of the clock, the way in which Vintage marketed their products, or the
Vintage brand in general. In addition, if the athletes are used as a
marketing tool to sell a different product, then they should be entitled to
grant or deny use of their identities for this purpose. They also deserve to
be compensated for rendering this service.
If celebrities feel they no longer have control over the presentation of
their identities, they might decide that the personal and financial costs of
either becoming famous or entering into authorized licensing agreements
are not worth the risk.24 This would harm both the economy and the
dissemination of entertaining and socially beneficial works.
Because a celebrity's identity, reputation, and livelihood are so
completely intertwined, misuse of his or her identity alters the very thing
that helped the celebrity achieve fame. If society is going to encourage
Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993), af'd, 38 F.3d 1218 (9th
Cir. 1994).
245. Allison, 136 F.3d at 1444.
246. See MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 2.2, at 2-10 (noting that some argue that the right of
publicity creates an incentive to create a commercially licensable persona).
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individuals to enter the public arena for its benefit, then society should
grant these individuals strong protection over their identities. Therefore,
the Allison court should have found that the sale of trading cards to
Vintage, without specific authorization by Allison and Hershiser, did not
give Vintage the right to use Allison and Hershiser's images to create and
sell a new product.
IV. CONCLUSION
Similar to copyright law, the right of publicity balances the interests
of the consuming public against those of the enterprising individual. In
copyright law, the first sale doctrine helps sustain this balance, but favors
the economic interests of the public over those of the individual. Applying
the first sale doctrine to the right of publicity serves a similar purpose.
However, with the right of publicity, an individual's actual identity and
reputation, either by name, likeness, or both, are at risk of being misused
for another's commercial gain. To prevent this misuse, courts should be
hesitant to allow the first sale doctrine to limit a celebrity's right of
publicity. Based on the mere deviation standard, where an existing product
has been changed in any way to create a new, unauthorized product, and
the celebrity's image is used to sell this new product, courts should refute a
first sale defense.
It is difficult to imagine athletes or celebrities choosing not to enter a
particular career because of the possibility of not receiving money from the
resale of a product bearing their names or likenesses. However, athletes
and celebrities, such as Allison and Hershiser, might think twice about
entering the public arena in the form of authorized licensing agreements if
they fear losing control over the use of their identities. Such a scenario is
antithetical to the right of publicity, which seeks to encourage celebrities to
perform enriching activities for a public arena, and to protect celebrities
from the unauthorized and uncompensated use of their identities for
commercial purposes.2 7
The Allison court should not have allowed the first sale doctrine to
defeat Allison and Hershiser's right of publicity claims against Vintage.
Applying the first sale doctrine to the right of publicity with a strict
derivative works analysis will balance the interests of society with those of
the celebrity. The first sale doctrine will tip the balance in favor of the
celebrity when the celebrity's image is in danger of being misused for
247. See supra Part ll.D.
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another's gain, thus affording protection to the celebrity who offers his or
her actual identity for the benefit of public consumption.
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